tv Politics Public Policy Today CSPAN June 4, 2014 11:00am-1:01pm EDT
sandy made landfall and rescued over 1,000 people. so we know these dollars are making a difference. and these investments also facilitate increased partnerships, not just at the federal level with my colleagues here, but at the state and local level and with port owners and operators. we've seen in a variety of instances, you can assure congresswoman hahn that we continue to make investments in the port of los angeles for information sharing and collaboration and, chairman carper, in the port of wilmington, the investments there not just in interoperable communications but in information sharing between the port and the fusion center in delaware that has allowed the building of relationships with state and local law enforcement and the port. i thought i'd also tell you where we are in the fiscal year
'14 grant cycle. $100 million was appropriated for the program this year. applications came in on may 23rd. the field reviews, as the admiral mentioned, we work very closely with the coast guard. we have a two-tiered review process. captains of the port work with the port area and the local and state government through area maritime security committees to prioritize projects. those applications are under that field review right now and will be referred for a national panel review here at the headquarters level later this month and then we expect to announce awards by the end of july. and so i'll close by saying that we look forward to the continuing dialogue about how we can continue to make these investments in the most effective and efficient way possible. we think they have made a real difference and i look forward to answering any questions you may
have. >> good, thanks. nice job. steve, please proceed. thank you, welcome. >> good morning, chairman carper, ranking member coburn, distinguished members of the committee. thank you for the opportunity to testify about the twic program. it provides a industry wide biometric credential to eligible workers requiring unescorted access to port facilities and vessels under the maritime security act of 2002. tsa administers the program jointly with the united states coast guard, tsa is responsible for enrollment, security threat assessments and technical systems. the coast guard is responsible for enforcement of card use. since the program was launched in 2007 in wilmington, delaware, we've conducted security threat assessments and issued cards to 2.9 million workers, including longshoremen, truckers and rail and vessel crews. the twic program is the first
and largest federal program to issue a biometric credential. working closely with industry and our dhs partners, the program has evolved over the years to address concerns over the applicability of federal smart card best practices to a working maritime environment, such as the requirement for two trips to an enrollment center for card enrollment and activation. tsa reformed the program by launching one visit in june of 2003 in alaska and michigan. this provides workers the option to receive their twic through the mail rather than requiring in-person pickup and activation. last month tsa moved from the pilot phase of the program to a phased implementation for all applicants. we have added call center capacity for applicants checking on their enrollment status. we've enabled web-based ordering for replacement cards. we've increased quality assurance at our enrollment centers. we've opened multi-program enrollment centers across the country to allow individuals to
apply for the twic, that has this material endorsement and tsa precheck. we will expand a number of enrollment centers to over 300 this year, adding to the convenience of workers. tsa continues to evolve and modernize their credentialing programs through these initiatives, strong collaboration at the department, partnership with industry and the support of this committee. thank you for the opportunity to testify today and i look forward to answering your questions. >> thank you, mr. sadler. and now steven caldwell, please proceed. >> thank you for asking us to testify on port security. we've issued almost 100 reports on port security since 9/11. our most recent comprehensive report on port security was issued in the fall of 2012 to note the ten-year anniversary of the maritime transportation security act. let's start with planning. there is a national strategy for maritime security issued in 2005. we reviewed that strategy and its eight supporting plans and
found much of the criteria that jao has laid out for a good national strat jeechlt we also looked at some of the more detailed functional strategies and in some cases we have found those to be wanting, but at the port level we found that some of the plans specific to the ports have included the safe port act's requirement that they also cover recovery issues. again, going back to some of the functional plans, we found some deficiencies in those. for example, dhs after putting out the small vessel security strategy and laying out an implementation plan for that has not been tracking the progress of the components and actually meeting that, which leaves some opportunities, lack of disseminating any potential lessons learned or even being able to track their overall progress on that strategy. in terms of maritime domain awareness, there have been a number of improvements. the coast guard through its common operating picture program has allowed additional data
sources into the use of the users, allowed blue force tracking, which is the ability to track our own vessels, and also increased access across the coast guard to other users. however, many of the original systems used to increase maritime domain awareness have fallen short of the capabilities that were originally planned for those and mainly these are due to some of the acquisition problems that our reports have noted, such as not developing complete requirements at the beginning, not updating costs or schedule base lines and not monitoring their initial performance. regarding the security of our domestic ports, dhs components, especially the coast guard, have gone quite a ways in terms of implementing the maritime transportation security act. key provisions of that act call for security planning at the port facility and vessel level and it also calls for the coast guard to then inspect those facilities to make sure that those security activities are indeed in place.
jao has audited those programs. we found progress and most of our recommendations in those areas have been implemented, but some areas remain problematic. as noted, we have concerns about the port security grant program and the extent that they are monitoring the effectiveness of the actual projects. going back to 2005, gao found that the program lacked an adequate risk assessment process and lacked a mean to measure the effectiveness of the projects in the grants. more recent work did find that the grants are based on risk and it goes back to the process that was started to be described at both the port and national level. after more than a decade after the program's start there's really no performance measures in place to determine whether the program at the port or facility level has improved port security. and it even lacks project level visibility to know whether the
projects were indeed implemented as described. regarding the global supply chain security, there's also been a lot of progress, especially by cvp. we've reviewed these programs and noted their management and operations have matured over time. we con cure with cbp that implementing 100% scanning as defined in the safe port act and 9/11 act is extremely challenging. however, we are less convinced that existing risk-based program does not have room for improvement. a recent report has found cbp has not been timely in terms of measuring the effectiveness of its targeting system or evaluating supply chain risks in foreign ports. we did see the may 5th letter from the secretary to you, mr. chairman, and note that both of those issues are discussed as potential improvements. in closing, gao will continue to review port security programs for congress, this committee and others. for example, we have ongoing work on port cyber security as
well as the disposition of high-risk containers. that concludes my remarks and i'm happy to answer any questions. thank you. >> thanks so much for that testimony. senator, nice to see you. why don't you lead us off. >> thank you, mr. chairman, appreciate it. i just wanted to get a follow-up, administrator sadler and certainly mr. caldwell about the twic program. so you testified about the one visit pilot and now it's going to a nationwide mailing system. so how do you assess it's going and are you able to do this without concerns about fraud? so just can you give us a quick update. you know, obviously i appreciate the steps you've taken on this but just in terms of substance. then i would like to hear from mr. caldwell about how effective you think overall the twic program is in helping protect port security and what other -- gao has been quite critical in
past reports about what we need to do to improve this program and its effectiveness. so that's really the issue i was hoping to get a little more insight on. >> we started the pilot for twic 1 visit last year in 2012-2013 in alaska and michigan. as we transitioned to our new technical system, we started the implementation nationwide, so we started implementing the one visit in may of this year, may 12th. so we planned to have a phased schedule to implement it across the nation and we should have it done by this summer. so we think it's going fairly well. we do mail the cards out. i believe we've got about 3,000 cards for twic 1 visit that have been mailed out of about 5,000 enrollments. what we do is send the card out separately and then we send the
pin in a different letter. so we try to send them out in two different letters. >> so you haven't seen fraud yet on that program? >> on the mailing itself? >> yeah. >> not yet, senator, but we're still in the early stages. implementation. >> thank you. and mr. caldwell, i know we're sort of in the middle of a vote so i just wanted to get a quick thought on one of the things i think we've worried on overall about the twic program, is it making us more secure. are we improving this system so that we can have some reliability with it? >> well, two things. i'll talk about twic 1 and that's trade opportunity, security and convenience. definitely it's more convenient but you're losing one of your steps of internal controls of identifying the person's identity by having them come in. i think congress pretty much directed and took to going that direction. >> they did. >> so it is what it is. >> but it's also good to follow up and make sure that we
didn't -- that the choice we made there, that i was obviously a supporter of, that we made sure we're following up on it as well. >> yes. i do think it's a good idea to follow up on that to see if there is fraud and whether that happens. >> what i'm worried about overall is are we really doing anything with twic? i get the goal of it, it makes sense, but we obviously -- the concern has been how are we enhancing port security overall? >> we have those concerns as well. we've had concerns with the program pretty much from day one in a lot of ways it was implemented. for example, the reader pilot that was done recently, we thought the valuation of that was done quite poorly and left out a lot of things that would be tiebl evaluate really what were the problems coming up. was it the card itself, was it the reader, was it the person that was manning the security gate when they did their test at the reader pilot. they did not include the kind of
detailed data you'd need to know to get that. obviously you know there's some concerns in terms of the shooting down in norfolk. >> yes, that was raised in the commerce committee. >> and the navy now is not accepting twic, at least by itself, as a card accepting to get on that base so obviously they have some concerns with it. there's been an assertion that twic has improved security and we've seen that in the latest report to congress but we haven't seen strong evidence supporting it. >> so you want better metrics. >> gao always wants better metrics, but yes. i suspect we'll be asked to look at it again. >> are we doing better? that's a good question, are we doing better? >> well, compared to nothing, having a pass that is used in multiple places with the background check is useful. you can have felons and things have things waived so they still have those cards, but you don't have people getting the cards
that have either espionage against the u.s. or terrorism crimes. that's a pretty high bar, but in one other way to look at it -- >> yes, that would be important. >> twic was put in as part of mitsa, which really the bar for mitsa is will they prevent a major transportation security incident and that's where this kind of a judgment call about whether someone getting and committing a crime, committing murder, would that rise to the level of a transportation security incident. not likely. >> if there's anything else you want to add, i know we've got to run to vote. >> just quickly. the first thing i want to say for twic 1 visit you have to confirm your identity -- >> the first time, absolutely. >> you've got to do that. the other thing i'd say is that this is the first time that the maritime population has been defined. prior to twic, there was no definition as far as i know and i spent 20 years going in and out of ports, so i'm not sure
who knew fanationally -- >> we now know that example. >> we now have a population of 3 million people. i vetted people before twic with information that was submitted by ports. we vetted 900,000 people. we did that prior to the implementation of twic as a mitigation strategy. now we're up to 3 million people. the first thing is define the population, we recurrently vet them every single day. we have one common standard, put the biometric aside, one common standard, one common credential, one common background check n some places you had to buy a multiple credential within the same state so if you went to one port, you had to buy a credential and you went to another port, you had to buy another credential. so we think there is improvement in security just by virtue of the fact of those things that i just mentioned. >> thank you. thank you, mr. chairman. >> i'm going to slip out, run and vote and then come back and
so dr. coburn can go back and forth. when i come back, i'll be interested in asking so you can be thinking about them are how do we measure success. i want to see if there's consensus on how we measure success. and if there's some consensus around common metrics, then how are we doing. what are we doing especially well, what are we not doing so well. and finally i always like to ask what can we do to help, all right? dr. coburn, thank you, all. >> thank you. have fun voting. let's keep talking about twic for a minute. we hit -- i'd just like your assessment on somebody with a twic card that gets into a port and shoots people. how's that happen? no system is perfect and i'm not laying blame. i'm just saying how did we miss that? >> at the time that individual was vetted, senator, the
standard for manslaughter included all manslaughter, voluntary and involuntary. so when the individual came through, the crime had been committed in 2005. the conviction occurred in 2008. i believe he served about 800 days on his conviction. so he served about two and a half years. he was released from incarceration in 2011. we encountered him in december of 2013. and based on the standards that we were using at the time, that voluntary manslaughter charge was not a disqualifier. so he got his card in january of 2014. as far as him using the card at the base, i would defer to d.o.d., but one point i have to make is the twic in and of itself does not give you access to a port. you have to have the twic and you have to have a business need. so we've gone back, we're
scrubbing all the cases we had for disqualifications that involve involuntary manslaughter and voluntary manslaughter and we've changed our policy now that if you come in with a voluntary manslaughter charge, that's an interim disqualifier. interim meaning that you are still eligible to appeal, you're still eligible to request a waiver, you're still eligible to request an administrative law judge review and you're eligible to go to court if you don't agree with the finding that we make. >> right. that's the kind of answer i was wanting. talk to me about twic readers. >> i'll defer to my colleague in the coast guard, but to senator carper's point about what we can do to increase security and how we can be more successful, that's one way to be more successful is by implementing the twic readers because we have a biometric credential. we believe that it works. right now it's being used as a visual identification card. but it needs to be used as a
biometric credential and on a risk-based basis as well. so we believe that it's critically important to install readers in ports. >> admiral? >> thank you, doctor. i really appreciate the opportunity to answer that question because as the agency responsible for implementing security at our port facilities and as a previous captain at port myself, i think it's important to recognize that twic and the twic reader are part of a greater access control system for a facility which has its own security system, which is in itself part of a greater system to secure our ports than the entire chain that i discussed. so when you're going to put an access control system in a facility, you're going to include fences, gates, guards, lights, cameras, a credential of some sort and in some cases a biometric reader for that credential so it's just a matter of layering the security. as the chairman noted in his opening comments, if this was
security at all costs, we'd have readers everywhere. because we are trying to balance, as we should, the risk with the benefit and facilitate commerce, we've done an exhaustive analysis, which i'm happy to explain to you, that has ensured that the readers go at the highest-risk facilities. and i think that the coast guard's proposed rule puts those readers where the cost benefit is currently the best. i think as we expand the use of twic and twic-like credentials beyond the maritime domain, because that's the only place we have transportation credentials, reader costs will come down, card costs will come down and the cost benefit will change in a way that it just makes sense to put readers at more facilities. >> do you have a proposed date where your first round will be completed and then an assessment made of twic readers? >> we are currently working on -- we put out a notice of
proposed rule making and received about 2600 comments so we're currently working through those comments and will make some adjustments to the rules. it will go through the process and hopefully be published next year and a two-year implementation date before the readers have to be in place. >> so we're two and a half years away from the completion of what the present plans of the coast guard are? >> we're two and a half years or so away from the date that i anticipate readers will be required at certain port facilities. >> okay, thank you. let me go back for a minute. ms. mcclain, one of your statements in your opening statement was spending money in a cost effective way. if y'all don't have metrics on the effectiveness of grant money that's spent, how do you know it's cost effective?
>> senator, i think that -- i appreciate the question. i think it's a little outside my lane. i'd prefer to take that question back and get you an answer working with my colleague from fema on where we are in developing metrics or answering that particular question. >> well, let me -- i don't think anybody will dispute that we've done some good with the money we've spent, okay. i'm not saying that. i'm just saying -- and anybody can answer this that wants and i'd love for gao to comment on it as well. we have a port system where we tier risks, and the vast majority of money has gone to tier one ports. and under the system you're utilizing today, without any recognition of the money that's already been spent, we continue to spend the same money on the same risks because there's no risk reduction recognized in your tiering. so if you don't have metrics associated with the money that's
being spent in the port security program, grant program, when do we stop spending money at tier one ports? in other words, how much is enough? and how do we know when we've got the best cost benefit analysis, the most cost effective program in, based on the risks and mitigation and the other goal that we have, how do we know that if we don't have a metric-based system? in other words, here's why we're spending this $2.9 billion. here's what we're hoping to get and here's how we're going to measure whether we've got it. because there's all sorts of -- i won't in this hearing, i will privately give you all the list of money that you spent on stuff that a common sense person says that doesn't have anything to do with port security. i can think of -- we have two ports in oklahoma, the port of muskogee and port of pestuga.
in terms of the risks associated with those ports, those are low priority things to me. so my question is, if we don't have metrics to measure and when we look at this in total, and i think you all have done a wonderful job in terms of laying this out, but how do we know? how do we know when to quit spending money that gives us a diminishing return on the port security grant program? >> senator, i'm happy to field that question. improved measurement is absolutely an area where we see a lot of opportunity. >> let me interrupt you there. >> please. >> what's your measurement now? >> in fy-13 we for the first time instituted measures related to sustainment of existing capabilities versus building new ones. we took the gao and mr.
caldwell's reports and recommendations quite seriously and are looking very closely on what ports are doing with the funding. we for the first time in the fy-14 application cycle are requesting project level data going in. you probably are aware of the history of the program and the flexibility that had been given at the local level against area maritime security plans. there remains a lot of flexibility, but we are increasing the oversight to request project level data up front so that we can start to get that information to form even more effective measures of outcomes. on the grants management side, senator, we certainly have measures now and even over fy-12, measures of our monitoring. mr. caldwell mentioned the level of monitoring.
100% of our port security grants now undergo some level of monitoring. we have a tiered monitoring system where our program staff on a routine basis look at every award, look at the history of the grantee, the history of the outcomes achieved, their financial measures from drawdown, rate of expenditure, rate of deobligation, and that then is reviewed and we do prioritize based on the risks we see and their management of the grants all the way up to desk reviews where we request a lot of additional information from grantees and then site visits. so what i would tell you, senator, is i look forward to continuing to work with you, to continue to get the data we need to form more effective measures. i agree with you that everybody can point to the examples, and there are really some stunning examples of how useful and
effective this funding has been, but i think you'd also agree with me the plural of anecdote is not data. we will continue to refine our measures to get that data. >> as i noted, i think it's improved, but i think we still -- you know, my underlying concern, somebody is going to be sitting up here ten years from now and the amount of money to spend on this kind of program isn't going to be there. so how we spend the money today is really important, because there's going to come a time. you know, i'll repeat for you, social security disability runs out of money at the end of next year. medicare runs out of money in '26. social security runs out of money in '32. by 2030, the entire budget will be consumed in medicare, medicaid, social security and interest on the federal debt. so my questions are all based on the future. and if we spend money really
well now, we won't spend money -- we won't need to be spending money in the future. so that's the basis of the question. it's not a criticism, it's just we need the best cost benefit value for every dollar that you send out in a port security grant. >> we agree with you and we are working with our partners on the vulnerability index, which is one of the things you mentioned, how do we understand what risk we have bought down and we'll continue to look at that to make sure we're spending the money as effectively as possible. >> thank you. admiral, one of my concerns, and i can't go into detail, but let me give you a hypothetical and you give me the answer. let's say somebody leaves one of our certified ports overseas and arrives here, but in between there and now something was added to that cargo. do we have the capability to
know that? >> well, doctor, i'm not exactly sure if they leave a foreign port -- >> they leave a foreign port that's one of our certified ports, one of our allies, meeting all the requirements that you all have. and someplace between when they left and when they arrive at the port of los angeles, somebody has added a package. >> so if that occurred at another foreign port -- >> no, not in the port. >> just in transit. >> in transit. >> the only way that we would be able to determine -- a couple of things would have to happen. probably the entire crew would have to be complacent with this individual that's carrying this out, because it's difficult to access particularly a container in transit without a significant amount of effort, and that would require probably more than one person. >> let's don't worry about the details of that. let's say it happens. >> if it happens, the way -- the only way we would know, and
really this is a better question for my colleague from customs and border protection, would be because the container has been opened and we would be able to determine that. maybe you can -- >> sure. senator, we have two elements that i think would be germane here. one, the import security filing gives us the stow plan for the vessel so we know where each container is on a vessel. whether that's going to be accessible during a voyage or not. we do see drug smugglers attempt to use what we call rip loads, where they break the customs seal, put a load just inside the doors of the container and lock it back up. that's really only doable on a vessel in transit around the deck area, so we know which containers could be accessed and then we do routine seal checks upon arrival to see whether or not those containers have been tampered with and whether those doors have been opened. so there are different steps in our layered process -- >> can somebody counterfeit your
seal? >> they can try to, yes. and we've detected, you know, dozens of attempts to do that, you know, pretty effectively. >> so they have not been able to do that as of yet? >> i won't say, senator -- >> that you're aware of. >> we do train our personnel to detect what our seals are supposed to look like, whether they have been tampered with, and there's number sequences and other kind of safeguards in this process. >> this is a long time ago but i'll just share an experience with you. i bought a company in puerto rico, put it into four containers, all the equipment, everything that was there. all four containers arrived at one of my plants here. all the seals were there. and when we opened the containers, everything of significant value that could have been marketed was gone but the seals were still there. so the fact is -- and that's way
before 9/11. that was in the '70s. but the fact is, is people will try and do it. so my question is, i guess my question is really this. do we have the capability to track ships from the time they leave a port till the time they arrive here and know whether or not they have been boarded or accessed between disembarkment and embarkment here? >> that's a question i probably can't answer in this venue, sir. >> got you. thank you. >> senator, did you want me to touch upon the metrics issue? >> yes, please. >> so i think we've seen a weak innocence metrics, at kind of a strategic level.
whether it's the national strategy or the more detailed functional plans, we have not seen metrics laid out early as to what we're actually -- what the end state is and how we're going to measure that, but we have problems particularly at the program level most often because those are easier to look for and find. i think we have found an improvement of the metrics of how the programs are run, and so one of the first things we do when we look at a program is do you know how the program is being run and have those metrics. a lot of times we'll find weaknesses in those internal controls and i think those have improved across the board. so when i say some of these programs have matured, a lot of it is better management of the program. where we have not seen large improvements is in the area of measuring results of the program and what they're trying to achieve. i would also agree with you the importance of cost benefit analysis a lot of times will get a discussion from the agency, well, that could be expensive and we don't have enough money to do it. in the end if you end up spending $3 billion on grants,
that's an outstanding record we've had for nine years that they come up with performance measures on the port security grants so maybe a couple of extra million dollars to do those analysis to develop those grants in hindsight looks like money well spent. maybe one example of cost benefit analysis that was done rigorously involves the advanced spec electroscopic portals drchl d.o.d. put in. it was not very rigorous in terms of the testing and we pointed that out. then we looked at how much those would cost marginally compared to the additional capability they were going to get, they cancelled the whole program. they cancelled it after spending $280 million but they were planning to spend $3 billion so that was the case that whatever the testing or analysis cost, i
think in the end led to a good result. >> okay. let me ask, mr. kamoie, do you all have plans to reinsert fiduciary agents to the spg? >> we do not, senator. >> and why is that? >> when the fiduciary malodel w used, it was at a time when the appropriation levels for the program were much higher. i think it was in '07 and after rounds of stimulus funding, the agent model was absolutely
necessary to assist the agency in distributing and monitoring the funds. over time, however, as the appropriations level has gone down and our internal capability with staffing has increased to manage the program, the fiduciary agent model has become less necessary. and in terms of monitoring performance, there was a varying level of performance by fiduciary agents in monitoring, and so given our increased staffing, our increased capabilities, we think it's more appropriate that we monitor and oversight of the grant funding and how it's spent. the other thing i'll say is that the allowability of management and administration costs from the grant program to fiduciary agents of 3% to 5% would result, for example, just this year in
$3 million to $5 million in overhead costs that we think are better invested in actual port security projects. >> do you have the flexibility under the appropriation rules to use some of that grant money for grant management? >> senator, i'll have to check the language and get back with you on that. >> but would that help you? in other words, rather than spending $3 million to $5 million on a fiduciary, if we spent an extra $1 million to $2 million on managing grants, especially cost effectiveness of grants and looking at that -- i'm pleased with the progress that's being made, i just don't think we're there yet, so i'd love to know what we need to do to help you to get to the point where -- you know, my model for grants at the federal government is the division of library and museum sciences. if you get a grant from them, you can guarantee that they're going to check on you, they're going to do a metric, they're going to know whether you followed your plan in the grant. and if you're not, they pull the grant and you don't ever get another one again.
so everybody has a different expectation. and so the fact that some grant money is going to thanings that aren't really for security, if you had that reputation, i guarantee you everything would be put down the way you want it put down, even though you have flexibility. >> i absolutely will take a look at that. we're willing to learn lessons from wherever we can. >> they're the best run grant program. >> appreciate that. >> the other thing is the spin out. you know, we're still in terms of we've granted but we've still got a long ways to go on spend down. where are we on that? >> sir, that's getting better as well. early on the program when ports were doing larger capital project infrastructure building with multi-phase complicated projects, it took a long time to spend down. a lot of those projects have been completed and we've taken a
number of steps to assist grantees in the spenddown. one, we remind them quarterly. we are in touch asking them to draw down. two, we shortened the performance to two years. but your question is where are we. in august of '12 for -- and we can follow up in writing with these numbers, but for the program years '08 to '11, 80% of the available funds were not yet drawn down. a year later for fy-08 to 12, every year one goes off the books, but we moved the needle down to 44% of funds not being drawn down. and we did a check at the end of april and right now we're at 39.3% not yet drawn down from '08 to '13. >> i'm going to have to recess this and go vote. senator carper will be back in a moment. >> thank you, senator.
i'm glad you waited. okay. let's see -- let's just see if we can see if there's any consensus on the metrics that we're using. how do we measure success. let's start with you, ms. mcclain. what are the metrics that we are using or ought to be using and using that metric or metrics, how are we doing? well or maybe not so well?
>> mr. chairman, i think there are several indicators that evidence success and progress in securing the ports. i would note that in the last seven years our relationships, our programs internationally, those global partnerships, the capacity building, the agreements, everything that's necessary to supply the whole global supply chain, i think there's been significant advancements in that area. i also think that our improvements in the advanced data and targeting area make us more secure. the coast guard's port assessments, 1500 ports, i think there are a lot of indicators that there's a global recognition of the need to tackle this issue on a broader basis. >> same question, admiral paul?
admiral paul thomas. >> thank you, mr. chairman. you know, i was in port in galveston, texas, in 2001 and for the three years that followed as we scrambled to figure out what it meant to secure our ports, so from my perspective, it's clear that we've achieved a lot. but i think one of the first things we did, and mr. caldwell mentioned the strategies that were out there. we recognized that in order to build a secure port, we first had to build regimes. we had to do it locally, nationally and internationally. then we had to build awareness so we could figure out what was going on and be able to pick out anomalies. then we needed the capability to respond to those anomalies. if you look at those three building blocks and compare to where we were on september 11th, 2001, to where we are today, it's clear there's been progress and there are clear metrics within each of those. with regard to regime, certainly the -- thank you to the congress for the maritime transportation security act and the safe port act but that was the impetus for the international regime, which is the international ship and
port security code as well as regimes that have been implemented as far down as individual port authorities. and i'm not talking about regimes that are just required by the law, i'm talking about they understand that security is now part of their business product. so i think in that regard there's clear measures. really an intangible probably from here but as a captain in port, you can tell you there was no awareness or recognition that security really was part of the product in the port. we had gotten the message across with regard to safety and environment but now they get it, it's part of their business as well. so i think there's a metric there. certainly with regard to awareness and capability, we've built the capabilities federally, locally, internationally, all of which i think are clear evidence that we've been effective in terms of enhancement. i'm with you, i think we need to do more. i think we can never rest on our laurels. i'm concerned about emerging threats like cyber. >> we'll come back and finish. first, how are we doing and what
are we doing -- what metrics are we using? but i want to come back and say what's on the to do list for us. okay. kevin. >> mr. chairman, i'm touch on five areas. broadly our ability to identify and mitigate risk is the metric we seek to measure ourselves on. first on the data front, we're getting advance information on all cargo shipments for the u.s. manifest information, entry information and import security filing, which is another 12 data elements that are critical. in terms of targeting and assessing that risk, category two, we're analyzing all of it with our automated targeting system which is a very sophisticated capability that is constantly improved and we're working on responding to the gao's ideas on identifying the effectiveness of those targets with more granularity. three, examining at the earliest possible point in the cycle. currently 85% of shipments that we identify as potentially high
risk are examined before they are laden onto vessels destined for the u.s. our examination requests of our csi partners foreign in our 58 ports are accepted 99% of the time. we think those are very solid metrics. 100% of containers identified as potentially high risk are examined before they are let into the u.s. stream of commerce, so 85% prior to lading and the rest of the 15% before they're allowed to enter the u.s. on arrival. securing the supply chain, category four. over 50% of all cargo containers by value are part of our ct-pat partnership with our 10,750 partners. we've increased the security of the supply chain through that partnership. we're also mutually recognizing other countries' systems, including the european union, and six other agreements to ensure broader visibility globally, as ellen alluded to, the international partnerships. five, our efforts to address the
highest consequence threats, rad nuc, we're scanning 99.8% of all arriving -- >> 68 that again, what percent? >> 99.8%. so just about everything arriving in a sea port is scanned through a radiation portal monitor, sophisticated sensitive technology for identifying radiological and nuclear materials. the other part of this coin, sir, the facilitation piece that you referenced, the vast majority of cargo arriving in the u.s. is released before it even touches the dock. our ct-pat partners are getting fewer exams. we've established mobile technology options to clear shipments right there on the dock instead of waiting hours and having those bananas sit in wilmington. the u.s. chamber of commerce and 71 others just wrote to the secretary this week in an open letter saying that this regime is working well and that the facilitation piece in particular, we've achieved through this layered risk approach. so those are the metrics we look at. i'm happy to elaborate on any
specifics. >> all right, fine. mr. kamoie. >> mr. chairman, i think while you were out what we agreed is in the port security grant program that we have measures, we've made progress, but that we agree we can continue to make progress. on the programatic side of the effectiveness measures, we looked very carefully at the six priorities of the grant program. enhancing maritime domain awareness, enhancing improvised device, radiological nuclear protection response and recovery capabilities, enhassing cyber security capabilities, maritime security risk, mitigation projects, planning training exercises and the transportation worker identification credential implementation. right now we have a measure that we're looking at, building new capabilities across those six areas and sustaining existing capabilities. but again, that measure can be better. on the administrative management
side, we've made progress in measuring our ability to effectively and efficiently release the funding, monitor programatic use of these funds, monitor grantee financial management of the funds, monitor the closing of awards and grantee drawdown, we're making progress, mr. chairman, and have an opportunity to make even more. >> mr. sadler. >> yes, sir. for us, i think it's about getting good quality information and data for us to make the right decisions on when we issue a card. it's about continuing to get that information after we issue the card so we can monitor the individual to ensure that they haven't done something to disqualify, whether it's on a terrorism watch list or through some type of criminal issue. i think the other thing that is going to make us better is installing readers. we believe that the coast guard, who are very close partners with us, we are with everyone else on the panel, has made the right
decision to take a risk-based approach and put readers where they need to be. and we think that's going to be a major improvement for our program, considering it's a biometric credential. the last thing we have to do is share information. which we do on a daily basis. so we need good, quality information to make good decisions with. we need the information to keep on coming so we can continue to make good decisions after we issue the credential. we need to install readers and we need to continue to share information, which we do on a daily basis with our partners. >> mr. caldwell. >> thank you very much. i mean the most difficult question is how do you measure security and risk. and i think we've actually looked at that quite a bit across a lot of these programs. i think one of the better program is a coast guard program where they can actually at the facility level actually try to measure the risk based on vulnerabilities and threats and various scenarios like that.
i think they did that. the coast guard also took a step trying to develop a more sophisticated measure of how much coast guard programs actually it was the percentage maritime security risk subject to coast guard influence in the programs. we're a little critical of this because in the end it was subject matter and the experts in the coast guard sitting down and thinking about what those reduction measures are and putting the single point of, you know, percentage on that. we had a couple of criticisms in terms of ways maybe we try to make that better and maybe giving particularly when there's so much judgment. you want to give a range instead of ae point estimate like that. they're looking at whether they want to keep that measure or not. it was a measure they were using
within the coast guard or said they were using, but they weren't really using for that much. if you have a performance measure, but they're not use it to monitor things or prioritize resources, you have to question whether it's a useful metric in the end. thank you. >> okay. some of you fwan to answer the second part of my question, but i want to take another shot at it. my staff -- my colleagues oftentimes hear me say and we can actually measure that we've not made nearly enough, and are there any of those -- think about how -- who can help make -- enable us to make progress that's needed.
us? legislative branches committee? president? his budget? who needs to help out? you want to go first? >> i think that just to sort of set the scene here, we certainly need an approach that's flexible, innovative so that we can take on the adaptive adversary, and we need something that -- an approach that's risk-based so we can make the most cost-effective use of our resources. that said, we recognize not -- that we don't want to have negative impacts on global trade, on -- we need specific improvements in the area of the targeting algorhythms, reducing the alarms, the working with our partners at some of the csi ports to increase the percentage of scanning that's undertaken.
across all pathways, focussing on a single pathway doesn't necessarily reduce overall risk, so as we go forward, we need to consider improving security across all transportation pathways, and, lastly, i would note that we are continuing the dialogue, the stake holders, to see what additional or expanded roles they might take in improving security of our ports. >> okay. thanks. admiral. >> i think there's -- the first is complace ens where i as we get further from 9/11. i think the sense of urgency decreases. from the congress on down, we have to make sure we maintain the sense of urgency with regard to port security because the threat is adaptive and as fwood as the physical security systems that we have in place are, there
are emilitiainging threats like cyber that we have not yet addressed. we've begun to address. i believe the coast guard has the authority so that we need to do that and we're working on what the resources might be, so you may hear about that. the other wrar that would be of concern is the real high-end threat that needs to be intercepted off shore as possible. some identified threat that's on for our shores. it requires shipsz and helicopters and things that are not only capable and that's the time when you need them. those two things are areas where we need to make sure where we continue to build our capability and to build our plans for action.
identifying risk, about the we want to continue to get better. that's an area, and we do get congressional support to continue to improve in that area. with the raid wrags portal monitors, we need to be able to dial the algorhythms. they're very sensitive for the threat materials we're worried about, but they reduce the naturally occurring radiological material alarms that we face on normal commoditiesing, like bananas, for instance, and granite and other things that do hit on our portal monitors. we don't want to waste time on those alarms. we want to focus on what could potentially be dangerous material. i think already continued opportunities globally. we're currently working with partners and broadening the scope of csi, security first, but also looking at other threats that a global supply chain, contra band, commercial fraud that can support criminal activity and so forth. enhancing fwloebl supply chains security standards. we did that after 9/11 with the
world customs organization and the framework of standards. there's always opportunities to take that to the next level. then, of course, the private seblgtor. continued opportunities there. not only on a supply chain side of the ct pat, but looking at whether from a terminal operator perspective there might be a return on investment to do greater security work prior to leading from a private sector perspective that we could then share and benefit in. we're pursuing all of these angles as the secretary noteed in his letter. >> there's a great point. i really appreciate your responses. i'll come back and ask the same question of the last three witnesses. i'll be right back. >> you want them to answer those? >> okay. thank you. >> let's talk about the 100% and the fact that we're at 2% to 4%. i think those numbers are right.
please correct me if i'm wrong. i would love for you to get in on this. there's no question the 9/11 mission said somewhere between 2% and 4% and 100% what do we need to be? how do we need to decide where we need to be? how do we become more effective in terms of container inspection? >> i'll start, and i'm sure -- i'm sure the question is not the percentage itself, but are we inspecting the right percentage? are we inspecting and identifying those containers that are high risk and mitigating that threat at the earliest possible point. we talked about some of the metrics that we are following whether we're accomplishing that
and just like to reiterate one of those elements for you, sir. on those containers that we identify as potentially high risk or automated targeting system. we are examining with our foreign partners under the container security initiative, 85% of those containers before they're ever laid on a vessel destined for the u.s. within that -- >> at the first port of arrival in the united states, so we are checking them before they enter the stream of commerce to the u.s. and getting 85% of them before they're even on a ship destined for the u.s. >> one of them has a nuclear weapon, and it's a little late, isn't it? >> yes. that's not the only layer that we have fired away. >> when you think about this, we're saying 85% of those deemed high risk. what is our goal to get to 100%
of those being high risk. >> my goal there, sir, is increasingly target with the right port foreign, how we can encourage them to examine anything we think is high risk. we have 58 csi ports. 80% of cargo destined for the u.s. we think we place those csi locations in the right places or currently, though, assessing how the threats have changed, are there certain strategically important ports that we can add capability and work with additional countries to encourage them to take measures before laying. as you mentioned working with term maloperators. is there a way we can encourage terminal operators to encourage the overall inspection if we think there's a return on the investment, working with customers to sell a security benefit that we can then benefit from and share in the information also? >> the container inspection
world really does belong to customs and border protection, although i can certainly attest to the impractical kalt of looking at every container as it comes through our yards. i have seen the targeting that we do jointly on cargo, and the ought mated processes are very effective and very adaptable. if there's a new intel stream that comes in, cbp can quickly change they are targeting and identify cargo that might be associated with a newly identified threat. >> all right. here's the question as a commonsense wrupt. >> the european union has done the constituted where i.
the private sector has done several studies. the challenge is, sir, there's 800 or so leyden for if one sneaks in and you have the tragedy that they spoke about at the port of los angeles estimating $1 trillion affect on our gdp, $16 billion doesn't seem that great, so where do we go? >> senator, thank you. i've thought about this a lot. we've done several studies on it. as far as the one study you're asking for, the only place i've
seen it is in a recommendation we've made, and i think that cbp and the department would have been better off at that point if they said this is it, this is the feasibility study, this is the cost benefit analysis. we're going to do it and try to put this thing to -- there have been multiple studies. i feel bad because i think the department in all the study -- all the little pieces have almost gotten there. i just would like to stop talk about kind of when popular myth -- the 9/11 commission never called 100% scanning of maritime cargo. >> what did they call for? >> they called for 100% scanning of air cargo. they said almost nothing about ports and maritime. >> okay. that's great to know. >> yeah. >> so -- >> but moving on, so the -- we
do think that challenges are likely insurmountable. the safe port act was left a lot of things undefined, and i think through the pilots cdp wanted to see what the undefined things would be. what's the cost? what's the point? there's a concern that it would create a false sense of security in a couple of ways. you could scan a container if it's kind of within a regime that we trust, a port that we trust, then we know maybe that container we have some confidence that after it's scanned and gets on that ship, it's going to be monitored or something like that. a lot of times we won't have those cases. a lot of the places, because of how ports are laid out where they do that scanning are off site. if that truck has to drive three to five miles, a lot can happen in that period. one thing the coast guard commented on, it's more likely that a weapon of mass destruction would come in and
not do a highly regulated regime like containers, but through small vessels coming in and snuck in some other way. they've looked at millions of containers and used the risk based analysis and are still finding things. it's not when they find drugs and these things that there's a one to one match that we had rated that one high risk. there are cases where they find stuff in there that had gotten through the system. drugs or other contraban. i think our approach is to look at the programs that we have. we would have liked to see the feasibility analyze. it's kind of water under the bridge, but we would like to see us doing a little better with what we have recognizing that
we're not going to have a perfect system. that's going to be optimizing your targeting system, which means that you're monitoring is it on a regular basis, you're testing it to see how it's doing. it's having the best csi footprint you can in terms of some of the ports. high risk ports. maybe they should pack up and, you know, shake hands with those partners. those partners will keep helping us. move some of the operations to other ports. >> do you have specific recommendations on ports from the gao? >> yes, we do. we do have a recommendation that they use the port risk model they had used in 2009 to initially plan the 100% scan or are thinking about that, and use a similar type model to figure out what ports are they in? we actually tried to reproduce that, and found 12 of the ports they're in were low risk ports. more than half of the csi ports were in high risk ones, but we recognize that there is some ports that aren't going to let us in. you know?
i mean, you've got some nasty players out there that aren't going to let a joint u.s. program into their -- we do have recommendations, and they are -- we understand -- >> let's go back to grants and the tiered port system for a minute. if we're not doing analysis on progress, do we re-evaluate the ports in terms of piers. here's tier one, tier two, tier three, tier four. is that done routinely, yearly, biannually? how often do we reanalyze high risk ports, one? number two is without the
metrics, but they're getting better, how do we take what we have improved and measure it to show a decreased risk for tier one port so that the dollars that you have can go to where the risks are the greatest? >> thanks for the question, senator. we reassess the risk of the nation's ports every year, and we use the risk formula that incorporates the most recent data we have available on threat vulnerability and consequence, and there have been times where changes in that risk data have resulted in the changes in the grouping of ports. for example, last year in fy13 there are eight tier one ports. san diego had change in its relative risk formula because these are relative to one another, and so this year it is not tier one port. we are making those adjustments.
we work very closely with the departments of intelligence and analysis unit to populate the risk formula with the most recent data, so, yes, we are looking at that continually. your second question, as to what the measurement and what i would consider to be buying down of that risk and the vulnerability, i fwrae we've got some progress to make there in terms of agreement on measurements and metrics to show that progress and show it in a way when the chairman comes back his question was about how can the congress help, and here i think my ask of the chairman and you, senator, is that we have a continue the dialogue about the types of data that would enable you to have more confidence and american people have more confidence that
we are making that progress and that we are being effective sturdz of the taxpayer dollars. i would agree with you that we certainly have made progress and we have plenty of good examples, but we would like to continue to work with you to get at the data and the measurement that would show that in a more compelling way? >> each port has a port security plan, right? >> right. >> what a total cost would be to bring it up on a cost effective benefit, how much total and all the tier one ports that we need to spend to bring them where they need to be. do we have that? do we know that? >> i'm not aware of that analysis. >> that's an important we because if you don't know what they need, we'll never get there. >> well, so, i mean, we
certainly at the captain of the board -- >> i know you know where the weaknesses are, and i know that's where the grant money is going, but i'm saying in the big picture if we're going to spend $100 million this year on port security grants and the total bull for bringing our tier one ports is $2.5 billion, you know, we're 12 1/2 years from bringing that, and by that time we're going to have replacement needs. so the question is don't we think it's important to really know by port here's the total cost to get us where we want you. which one have those top eight ports, which one has the greatest vulnerability and should we not be spending maybe $70 million at one point and $30 million at the other eight on the basis of what the total need is to bring them to that level where we feel confident? >> well, absolutely, we'll take a closer look at that. we have moved the entire suite
of grant programs towards performance measurement against the core capabilities that are in the national preparedness goem following up implementing the president's directive, presidential policy directive aid on marshall preparedness. we continue to find the performance measures for those. through the threat hazard identification and risk assessment process, we are asking grantees to do a lot of what you are talking about in terms of identifying capabilities and then using the investments to close the capability gaps, so we are moving in that direction. i'm not aware of a single analysis where we have put a price tag on what it would take to close the gap. we'll certainly take a look at that. >> i just think that the really important thing to know because
you're going to have limited funds from here on out. send in the tlarz where the greatest risk is. >> i would just recommend you look that the. i don't know what the gao has any comments on that or not. >> if i might, we'll take a close look at that. i think the threat has identification risk assessment process, and the area maritime security working groups at the local and port level i think they're getting at a lot of that, but i agree with you, we could make it more progress. >> if i could just -- until your points, the first had to do with how do you account for a risk down with previous grant p money in determining the risk ranking for the next -- we wul do that as part of the coast guard's maritime security risk assessment model that gao mentioned. if we have invested in a system that reduces the vulnerability or mitigates the consequences,
that gets reflected. that's part of the formula that we use for the tier of the next we're year. it is in there. the other piece that you ask about is have we defined what a secure port is. i watched the initial focus be on securing individual facilities. let's make sure we have fences and cameras and guards and rpm's and get facilities. then i saw evolve to we need to really secure this port as a system as well. how do we link these fences together? we invested in things like communication systems that would allow everyone and surveillance systems that were focused on the common infrastructure, not on the private sector. have we been able to address when we need to recover? we invested in trade. it's been a naturalel use. i believe we're still in that evolution because we have
emerging threats supper as cyber. i think the next round of grants is putting money towards cyber vulnerability assessments so we can then understand what it's going to take to secure the cyber infrastructure of the maritime. i don't know that we'll ever be able to say we're there, but i do see a very logical progression on how we focus our planning and our investment. >> we have a diagnostic system for cyber within homeland security. is the twik system applicable to that system? >> let me take that one, sir. >> yeah. >> right now the way the twik system works is that the contractor provides to the system. it then gets back to the tsa. the system whether it's on the enrollment side, the date wra center side, up to the tsa side has built the federal standards. they have to go through a
certification and accreditation. they go through auditing. they go through testing. it's not monitored through the dhs system. it's monitored through the tsa operation center. everything from the contractor's date wra center. >> i would like to have you answer my wrerl question. the next question i'm going to ask of all of you is what is our to do list on this committee and in the congress? >> i ask you and the committee is for a continued dialogue, and i share this with ranking member before he stepped out. a continued dialogue about the types of data and the types of
measures that would give you the confidence, give the american people the confidence that we are investing the grant dollars in a way that is most efficient and most effective and that we're all good stewards of these resources. i agree with admiral thomas. this is -- threat is evolving. so, too, have our measurement of where we're headed next, so we appreciate a continued dialogue with you about how we define the measures of success that will give you the confidence that we're all looking for. >> okay. hanks. >> something for our trigger list to continue to make progress. >> i think it's just continued support and helping us get, you know, from tsa's point of view, the readers on the coast guard's point of view, understanding that the coast guard is prom you will gating the rule, and when i say we need the readers, we need
the readers, that's not in any way, you know, insin waiting that there's some delay on the rule side. there's a lot of work that went into we could put readers in place and use the full capability of the card. i think to the admiral's point before, it's critical that we maintain mission focus. it's also critical that we make risk-based decisions so we protect the right wrarz. >> thank you. >> senator, i'll do kind of a combo answer to -- i'm still busy trying to answer the question you asked before and then the last one. i'll see what i can do here. i have three things. two, kind of for the agencies to do and one for the committee to
do. they make the infrastructure controls not predictable. you keep deter answer out there. i like what i see at cbp when they're doing -- they call their key side or dock side scanning where a ship will come in and they'll target a ship, and it won't be based on whether the containers are high risk or not. they'll be scanning every seventh one or tenth one. maybe there could be more flexible is csi and the food that they have and think about whether they need to ship that deckation bit to different countries if possible. i think cyber is the growing area. it's an area where dhs and coast guard had been monitoring the situation, and they're talking about taking action, but i think they do a report we're issuing tomorrow for senate commerce that will have a lot more detail on our thoughts on that. then something for this
committee, and i think it's starting to show up on the radar of the agencies as well is for what we have, we do have to sustain it, and you have vessels, and you have scanners and you have aircraft that have -- that are pretty important in this regime, including some of the interdiction and deterence and just the daily things like scanning containers, and some of these are reaching the end of their life. i know that cbp is trying to extend the range of their scanners from, say, ten years to 13 years, but at some point you're going to have a lot of -- you've built all these -- this regime and all the things that go with it. it takes -- it will take some sustainability, and it will translate into resources. what is our to do list, and i don't know what i -- ms. maclean, you and admiral thomas
and mr. maclean had a chance to do that. our to do list. >> chairman, i think i just echo some of the points that were made earlier and emphasize that in moving forward anything we do needs to take into consideration the dhs confronts a multitude of threats and so, you know, to be cost effective and efficient we need to always bare that in mind. i think the second point we made earlier is that big picture, security across all pathways to buy down risk don't want to encourage sort of a balloon effect where we put all our security assets over here and the adversary just circumstance upvents that. the picture has got to be across all pathways. then echoing mr. caldwell's point about the aging infrastructure and funding dhs in accordance with the president's budget. >> thanks.
admiral thomas. anything you have that we should be doing on the legislative side? >> thank you, chairman. i don't have much to add to what's been said. there may be some very specific authorities and capabilities we identify as we continue to analyze the threat with the ports, but i think we have the right access through the staffs to get that information to you. i would say that this type of oversight and continued focus by this committee on this issue is really important to staif off that complace ensy that i'm concerned about. we do appreciate that. >> thank you. >> four quick things. echoing several things that mr. caldwell mentioned. continued support for the key programs we discussed today. the automated targeting system. we're actively working on the recommendations that mr. caldwell mentioned. we'll be working with your team on those plans. three, what you are articulating at the beginning, mr. chairman,
understanding the critical economic expeditious and facilitated movement of cargo aspect of our mission. that continues to be critical and needs to be understood. then, four, working with the secretary and the department on an agreed path forward on scanning. keeping us honest on a good faith effort. we discussed working together with the framework for the best future. >> i think dr. coburn when i was -- asked a question dealing with fiduciary agents, and i just want to come back and -- i just want to come back and say the second half of a question. maybe i'll take a shot at it. i need to be someplace else, literally, in eight minutes. whoever would -- i'm going to ask you to take a shot at this. here's my question, though. rather than ending the use of fiduciary interest for all ports, why not let ports decide
for themselves if they would like to use one? >> we've considered that proposal and don't think it is in the best interest of the program. as the appropriations have gone down and our capabilities internally have fwroen in terms of program oversight management and monitoring, we've gotten a pretty good window into the project level data and the approach grantes are taking. we lost some of that visibility. as you might expect, there was a variety of performance -- varying levels much performance across the fiduciary performance model, and then the other thing is with the management and administration fee, the fiduciary agents had access to
3% to 5% of the fund. we think those are better invested in actual security projects. i know there's a range of opinions in the port security. we decided that the best thing for the most effective and efficient management of the program is to bring that management in house and not use the fiduciary model. >> in this last question, it's for ms. maclean, admiral thomas, and really short answers. if you would. the first question is what affect has increased security on land borders had on -- what affect has increased security along our land borders had on maritime border security, and ellen, if you just take 30 seconds. >> yes, mr. chairman. two quick points. i think the trusted trader programs that we developed in the land border context informed how we deal with those programs in the maritime context, and,
second, i think it pointed out to us, and i real quickly go back to south florida in the 1908s how you need a risk-based approach to secure any single pathway. thank you. >> thank you. admiral. >> somewhat outside the realm of port security, but certainly we have seen the balloon effects on particularly the southern part of the west coast and also in the care bean as we secure our land borders for trugz and contraband and other illegal activities they've taken to the water. we've adjusted our forces. that's really the impact that we've seen there. >> great. thank you. >> agree with the admiral. we have not seen a significant impact in terms of changes in the threat within commercial flows. we have seen the effective security between ports of entry push activity out into the -- on the west coast as well as up through puerto rico.
>> there was a second half to that question, but i don't have time to ask it. you may not have time to answer it. i'm just going to wrap it up here. i'm really glad that dr. coburn has these hearings. it's timely. there's a fair amount of progress, and there's still plenty of work to do. i'm encouraged -- sense of team is at play, and that certainly helps. we are part of that team. thank you all for your preparation today for helping to make this a very, very good hearing. it's clear to me that one of the most important take-aways from today's hearing is that it's critically important that we strike the right balance. it's not an easy thing to do. it's hard to strike the right balance between security and make sure we do not unduliy impede the flow of transportation and trade. as you all know, 95% of our trade moves on the water, but the port is vital to our
nation's well accident, and they're a conduit for a lot. we will have sent some of my colleagues will have -- let's see here. some questions to ask, and we may have some ourselves. the hearing record will remain open medical may the 19th. it says until may 19th. probably should sar june the 19th at 5:00 p.m. for submission of statements and questions for the record and with that i would say to our republican staffer and our democratic staff and all my colleagues, thank you very much for helping us and to each of you for joining us today. i think one or two matters. maybe admiral said oversight is a good thing, and we hear that a lot. we won't disappoint you. thank you.
if you missed any of this hearing, can you watch any time. we have a lot coming up today. first lady michelle obama will be joined by mayors from around the country to talk about veteran homelessness by the year 2015. also expected to speak at the event are housing and urban development secretary sean donovan, and acting veterans affairs secretary sloan gibson. it's live on c-span. later, the senate privacy subcommittee holds a hearing on location tracking apps and smartphones and other devices.
a bill to outlaw the tracking of consumers without their permission has been introduced by senator al franken who chairs the subcommittee. officials from the justice department and the federal trade commission will testify. that's live at 2:30 p.m. tonight at 8:00 we'll bring you two panel discussions marking the 25th anniversary. the tianamen square crackdown that began in the early hours of june 4th, 1989. here's a preview. >> remember that night of june 3rd. >> there was a narrow airport road. a bus driver. working class bus driver parked his long bus across the airport road to block the troops coming in. the first truck load of troops arrive. the man did -- he moved aside
his bus. he refused. officer pulled out his pistol, pointed it at him and demand that he move -- that he drive the bus off, and the driver had the keys in his hand, which is at night, he threw them into the grassy verge there and, you know, he was not executed immediately. i don't know what happened to him, but to do that, to block the troops from going to tianamen square, you know, boy, i'm incredibly admiring of -- there were displays of courage that night that i have rarely seen equalled and maybe never surpassed. >> next portion of one of the panel discussions we'll have tonight marking the 25th anniversary of the tianamen square crackdown. watch it beginning at 8:00 p.m. eastern on our companion network
c-span. >> on a lonely wind-swept point on the northern shore of france, the air is soft but 40 years ago at this moment the air was dense with smoke and the cries of men and the air was filled with the crack of rifle fire and the roar of canon. at dawn on the morning of the 6th of june, 1944, 225 rangers jumped off the british landing craft and ran to the bottom of these cliffs. their mission was one of the most difficult and daring of the invasion. to climb these sheer and desolate cliffs and take out the enemy guns. the allies had been told that some of the mightiest of these guns was here and they would be trained on the beaches to stop the allied advance. the rangers looked up and saw the enemy soldiers at the edge of the cliff shooting down at them with guns and throwing grenades. the american rangers began to climb. >> this weekend american history tv will mark the 70th anniversary of the d-day
invasion of normandy starting saturday morning at 10:30 eastern. watch this year's commemoration from the world war ii memorial in washington. that's followed at 11:30 by author and historian craig simons. lel discuss his new book neptune, the allied invasion of europe and the d-day landings, and at 12:30, mr. simons will take your questions and comments live. at 1:30 a look back at pre presidential speeches commemorating the day. all at american history tv saturday on c-span 3. >> now, a hearing on the economic impacts of climate change on the wildlife and agriculture industries. forestry, farming, and wildlife sectors. the senate environment subcommittee is chaired by oregon senator jeff murkley.
>> new economy subcommittee to order. just yesterday the president made a historic announcement moving forward with a proposal to tackle the single largest source of climate pollution in the wraits, coal fired power plants. this action could not have come too soon. what we're seeing already are real impacts of climate change, impacts that are being felt today on the ground. it's no longer a conversation about hypothetical events or
computer models, what might or might not happen in the future. it's a conversation about the real cost to our natural resources in our rural communities and our economy right now. a few weeks ago the national climate assessment came out with the most up-to-date review of climate science and particularly focused on the impacts we are already seeing across the united states. this report combines the expertise of dozens of the most preeminent scientists to conduct a comprehensive review of scientific literature to illuminate both the climate impacts we are starting to see today and the type of impacts we can expect to see in coming years. what was notable in that reported is how much impact we are already seeing in sector that is are critical to our rural communities and their economy, such as farming, fishing, forestry, and hunting. these impacts aren't always straight forward, as we'll hear from some of our witnesses today. climate change is one of medical challenges facing the sectors. it is playing increasingly an
important role such as drought and disease even worse. the long-term trend towards warmer and shorter wirntsz is allowing more insects like bark beetles to survive the cold causing massive tree die-offs in forests across the country and making forests more susceptible to larger and more intense wildfires. in oregon, snow melt is a critical component of irrigation waters and so little rainfalls during the summer months. for 2010 and 2013. demonstrating the demonstration we can expect to see a severe and intense droughts become more common. the decrease in snow pack also means our streams are warmer and
dreer during the summer months. there's an impact in fresh water fishing. less snow melt and hotter summers are expected to contribute to a significant decline in salmon populations. our ocean fishermen have been dealing with the effects of climate change too. warming oceans are causing fish to migrate, and oceans are absorb i absorbing. >> to prevent the impact of climate change from getting worse. the witnesses we have invited here to testify are people with firsthand experience working the farming, fishing, and forestry sectors. we also hear from as climate change skeptics.
finally, i would like to extend a special gratitude to our colleague, senator john tester, who was here to speak on this subject. not only as a senator from a state that will be impacted by climate change, but as a farmer himself. we'll ask senator tester to speak as soon as the opening statements are completed. with that i'll turn this over to ranking member senator wicker to give his opening remarks. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman for holding this hearing. it's our first hearing today. i want to thank all of our witnesses for being here today. first witness and the panel that will follow. as we discuss the impact of climate on farming, fishing, forestry, and hunting, we must not neglect the effects that draconian climate regulations will have on these industries. yesterday as part of the private action plan, epa administrator mccarthy announced a new set of rules to regulate carbon dioxide
emissions from existing power plants. these regulations would have little effect on the climate, but the rules would have a negative effect on the livelihood of all energy users including farmers, foresters, and fishermen who are the focus of today's hearing. the president's costly regulations mean that farmers who irrigate their crops by pump would face higher utility bills. foresters would pay more for electricity to turn their timber into paper. products that are essential to our economy. these already face a myriad of challenges in a difficult economic environment, but at what cost are we going to hurt these economic sectors in the pursuit of aggressive but dubious climate regulations. the cost to these industries are assured to go up. the benefits are not. farmers are said to be on the front line of climate change because they are most likely to be effective by altering weather
patterns. in a recent scientific pier reviewed study that examined u.s. crop producer's per acceptings of climate change, researchers found there is little belief among farmers that climate change will have a negative effect on crop yields. in fact, in my home state of mississippi corn and soybean yields are at record high levels. farmers had been managing their crops effectively and adapting to variable climate conditions for generations and generations. this is nothing new. unfortunately, this generation will now have to cope with higher electricity costs because of questionable climate regulations. for farmers who properly manage their land, a changing climate is not the problem. burdensome regulation that is increase the cost of farm production are. america's forests provide many benefits and services to society including clean water, recreation, wildlife habitat, and a variety of forest products. need we be reminded that carbon
dioxide is required for photosythesis. the product by which these forests use sunlight to grow. scientists have dubbed this effect co2 fertilization. >> melty managed forests cover 50% of my home state. these support industry that employs 25% of mississippi's manufacturing work force. given the current depressed market for forestry goods, higher prices for electricity would only worsen industry problems. for foresters, we properly manage their trees. a changing climate is not the problem, but regular laying that is increase the cost of forestry production are. i am struck, mr. chairman, and
my fellow senators, with the increasing number of academics willing to come forward and say, yes, on some of this conventional wisdom, they are skeptics. i asked to put it to the record at this point, mr. chairman, the transcript of an interview yesterday afternoon on wtop with dr. peter morrissey, university of maryland professor at the robert h. smith business school. >> without objection. >> let me just point out in the final minute, mr. chairman. professor morris where i says a lot of this -- speaking of the president's new plan yesterday, is going to needlessly raise costs, but more importantly, much more importantly, the president's goal, the amount of carbon dioxide we will save china makes up with additional emyin emissions in only 18 months. remember, co2 emyings is very different than smog, and the vimpltists right now want to
confuse that issue saying you certainly don't want smog and asthma and things like that. co2 emissions is about the greenhouse effect and rising temperatures. asked about the thought that if the u.s. doesn't do something, the countries like china and india definitely won't, professor morrissey says, well, we are already doing something. >> anchor says -- professor morrissey says we are doing something, but the trick is to do something that matters that has an effect. the president is touting this as a solution, and it is not. finally, he concludes we're going to have to deal with a rising sea level whether we do this or not. the question is will we have an economy that can bare what will
be the truly large burden, much larger than this one? thank you again, mr. chairman, for holding this hearing. we should be creating jobs and strengthening the economy. not hindering it. >> thank you, senator. >> we need to ask ourselves what the true facts are. we will do so. in a growing number of scientists are demonstrating the falsity of many of the allegations that have been made as a result of warming temperatures and climate change. we simply have to be honest about that. our economy is xreedingly fragile. >> the average median income is
thousands below what it was. we have fewer people working today than we did in 2007. unemployment remains high. we simply cannot regulate and impose cost on american industry to the extent to which they cannot compete in the world market and damage our economy. only a healthy economy and free nations has the environment consistently improved. unhealthy economies in totalitarian countries have the worst record by far of environmental issues. mr. chairman -- mr. ash will testify. i'm pleased in his written statement at least. he did not repeat his statement before this committee that we are having more frequent and severe storms, spreading droughts, and wildfires. that's not so. when i ask him about it, he gave anecdotes. he submitted not one scientific
report to justify that statement when many scientific reports reject president obama has weiss claimed that temperatures are rising faster than. even over the last ten years, he said. well below the average computer models for environmental expectations. all i'm saying it i don't know. maybe this is a temporary -- some of the climate change that's been projected. maybe temperatures will rise again, but they're not rising like the experts predicted today. we've got more scientists like dr. smith before us today that will puncture some of the irresponsible statements that are being made about forestry. mr. president, i grew up in the country near edenberg, alabama.
you understand the timber industry. i guess the saw mill was one of the classic big saw mills. i saw logs hauled in front of my house all the time, but all of that land has been replanted. it's being managed exceedingly well today. farmers are -- and timber owners are managing better than ever scientifically and each one of those trees, you know, as they grow, they -- dead and dying tree emits -- once it dies, it emits carbon back into the atmosphere. wood, forest,s and, one of the best ways we can reduce co2 in the atmosphere. it just is. i feel strongly about that. with regard to honey and
wildlife -- behind my house was a little creek. i calculated one time i spent a year of my life in and around that creek. swimming in it, playing in it, fishing in had it. you go behind that creek. miles of just basically forest, but we saw very few deer and very few turkey. in alabama today you visit people in my area of the state and talk to friends and you leave their home at night, and they'll say watch out for the deer. deer are everywhere. they're eating people's gardens. they are almost a pest. because really i guess better management. i don't know why. turkey, people hunting better. they're managing their lands better. we have a clear without a doubt increase in game in alabama today, and i think throughout the rest of the country. we made a lot of progress. we need to continue to make progress.
i am looking forward to the hearing today, and having a hearing in judiciary and involving the amended -- the first amendment to limit people's ability to speak out in elections so i'm going to oppose that in a little bit. thank you, mr. chairman. i appreciate this good here. >> i have to tell you that my wife is upset because the deer are eating her bagonias. you know my wife well enough to know that if she's not happy, i'm not happy, so i have a stake in this. first of all, i'm glad that clay pope is here from oklahoma. i appreciate your coming. you and i have worked together with frank lucas and some of our small dam rehabilitation projects and i look forward to hearing your testimony, although i have already read it and won't be able stay for it.
all we talked about around here since -- it's trying to resurrect and trying to make people believe that the world is coming to an end. this is the 31st, 31st, hearing this committee has had -- this committee -- i'm talking about the whole committee now -- on global warming since senator bob is chairman, and with each one, the polling data has declined. i mean, it started off with the number one or number two issue. the last gallop poll said it was number 14 out of 15. now, i have to say that i know oklahoma's global warming regulations are no friend of farmers. it's interesting that this -- the title of this hearing is farming, fishing, forestry, and hunting. farming, you come to oklahoma and talk to farmers, and they'll tell you, this is really a crisis that we're in the middle of right now considering all these regulations. in fact, i'm going to quote, tom buchanan, he is president of the oklahoma farm bureau. he told me just yesterday this is his quote, they'll have a
devastating effect if these regulations go into effect on the farmers of rural oklahoma. it will be our number one concern and number one issue. that's the oklahoma farm bureau that is speaking. regulations for existing plants. and we understood on new plants that was a little bit different. that was very, very costly. but existing would even be more so. the figures that we have is that we require power plants around the country to reduce their greenhouse emissions by 30% to 2005 levels. now, we have done our own study for a long period of time going all the way back to right after kyoto was never submitted for ratification and found that the cost of that, and this comes from wharton school, m.i.t., comes from charles rivers associate is between $300 billion and $400 billion a year. that would be the largest tax increase in history. we know the chamber's come out with the amount of money it's going to cost in jobs and all of
that. now for decades the environmental left has pushed to enact, and again congress has rejected. now we've tried, we've had this before congress now, about 12 times, it has been rejected every single time. and each time by a larger margin. the first one was 2003. that was the mccain lieberman bill and then two years later it was rejected even by a larger -- a larger amount. so, it used to be the number one and now it's the number 14 concern, and it's a very large concern. so regardless the president is pushing this regulatory thing. we don't have to look any further than obama's model to come up with a conclusion. he talks about his green dream being the journey. you and i were just there not long ago senator sessions. that country is about three years ahead of us in coming through with all these regulations and continuing a war
like our president obama has had since he's been in office. and there -- their costs for electricity now has doubled since they started that program three years ago. doubled. it is now three times the cost per kill watt hour of what we have here in this country. we know american people know it will be expensive and is very alarming that we have to do this. you know, to stay within my time frame i'm going to have to submit the whole statement for the record. but i want to get, if this is true, if we're now in a spell, in a period of time 15 years where there's been no increase in temperature, and now saying that this might be the coldest year -- weather of the year, all that is a matter of record, then why is this all of a sudden surfaced as an issue. and i would say why it surfaced. there's a guy right here, his name is tom steyer, s-t-e-y-e-r,
he has come out and documented -- he's a multibillionaire, he's going to put $100 million in the legislative process to try to resurrect global warming as an issue. $50 million of this is his own money, and he'll raise the other 50. i can tell you right now it's not going to work. i know it's a lot of money, and this will be going to candidates who are going to be supporting global warming and all of that stuff. so we know that it's going to be -- it's going to have an impact. it is a lot of money but the people of america won't buy it, and i would say this, i've already made an announcement, mr. chairman, that -- and there's a possibility i could be chairing this committee again, that when these regulations are finalized, i'm going to offer a cra, congressional review act on each one of them because that's the only way that we can have people get on record, either supporting or rejecting this and i have a feeling that we're going to be able to stop it, in spite of -- by the way, this article be put in the record at the conclusion of my opening statement.
>> thank you. without objection, your time has expired. >> thank you mr. chairman. >> we're now going to hear from senator tester. delighted to have you with us today, both in your role as a u.s. senator and observer of facts on the ground in montana, and as a generational farmer. >> thank you, chairman merkley, and ranking member. i would like to say before i get into my prepared remarks, i don't know tom steyer from a bar of soap but i would be more than happy to work with anybody to put some transparency on the dark money that comes into this elections. and i know this isn't a hearing about elections and dark money. but if we want to save our democracy a think that's the first step. i think we could get to the bottom of a lot of this stuff that's going on as far as influence and political agenda here in washington, d.c. with that i want to thank -- >> as my name was used. this isn't dark. this is light. this is something everybody knows. it's out there in all the publications. that means that much to some
people. i just want to clarify that. >> then let's get rid of that and the dark money, too. mr. chairman, i would first of all appreciate -- appreciate you having me here today, along with ranking member wicker, feels like we should be on cross fire, roger, but we'll do it here. look, i'm not a lawyer, i'm not a scientist, i'm a u.s. senator, but more importantly i'm a farmer. the impacts of climate change are felt far and wide and i believe we need to take responsible steps to mitigate the impacts. what those steps are, some came out by the epa yesterday, some folks have some other ideas. i'm more than happy to listen to them. the epa released a proposal for reducing carbon emissions from existing power plants. they went with a state-based solution. i think that's smart. to our problems, and i will work to ensure this proposal works for montanans in my home state. i think refusing to act to protect clean air and clean water is not a viable option.
i think in the long term, and in the short term it's going to cost jobs and a way of life. as i said a minute ago i'm a third generation farmer. i farm in north central montana. i have seen the impacts of climate change firsthand. this does not mean i have people that farm the land. this means that i do it with my wife. we finish seeding two weeks ago last saturday. this piece of land was homesteaded by my grandfather and we have farmed it for the last 40 years, my wife and i. my folks, 35 years before that. and my grandparents 35 years before that. for the average american, particularly those of us from rural america the political conversation about climate change seems worlds away. for us, we have had warmer winters. we have had more extreme weather events. and there are already presenting new challenges for our way of life. do i say those statements because i read an article in some magazine?
no. i say it because this is what i have seen on the farm. let me give you an example. my dad farmed from 1943 to 1978 and never got a hailstorm that allowed him to collect more than his premium that he paid for that hail insurance. i've been hailed out four times in the last 35 years. and this month alone, the month -- i should say last month, we're in june now, in the month of may, we have seen severe hailstorms all over the state of montana, totally unregulated, totally out of character. these are storms that usually would hit in july or august. they're storms that break out windows in cars. they break fences. golf ball sized hail or bigger. and we've had them up in my neck of the woods just south of my place, to down in billings. 230 miles south of that. at the turn 1999/2000/2001 we've got a reservoir on the place my dad built in the late '40s, when he dug it, it filled up with water.
in '99, 2000, 2001 it dried up for the first time ever. if you take a look at what's going on as far as disaster assistance, and i appreciate some of the comments made by the senators on the roster, on how this could affect our timber industry -- i'm talking about the now epa regulations, how this could affect agriculture, in the last two years -- 20 years ago the forest service spent 13% of its budget on fighting fires and i can almost guarantee you that budget 20 years ago was a heck of a lot smaller than it is today and they spent 13% of it. now it's 40%. and they still have to transfer half a billion dollars to cover costs. we're going to spend more than $15 billion on hurricane sandy relief efforts alone. i cannot think of a time we've had a hurricane hit new york. but it did with sandy.
i think today's hearing appropriately focused on experiences of farmers, ranchers, foresters, that they're going through. unfortunately the stories are often overlooked, underreported or not reported at all. as a nation i think we need to start paying attention because these experiences are important if we're going to have a debate here in washington, d.c. and we're going to listen. scientists tell us the climate change will bring shorter, warmer winters, and in montana i see it. when i was younger, frequent bone chilling winds whipped across the prairies, 30 below for two weeks at a time was not an exaggeration. now, it seems like if we have temperatures below zero, it is the exception. do you want me to cut it off now, by the way? has this been five minutes already? my god. sorry about that. time moves quickly but i think we'd like to hear from you. >> i apologize. i usually don't do this. but changes in the weather are forcing different ways to operate our farm.
and to be honest with you, it's -- it's more difficult to figure out how. we haven't had a gentle rain this month of may. may is our wettest month. i planted that we finished planting those crops two weeks ago, they're not going to come out of the ground until we get some moisture. this is pretty abnormal. we've had droughts before, but this is -- this is abnormal stuff. the end of bitter winters you think gosh it's less soil you're going to have to heat the house or propane or wood or whatever you're doing but the fact is those winters and the lack of cold winters has allowed a little beast called the saw fly to show up and if you don't deal with the saw fly by adding another operation, it can take as much of the crop as a hailstorm would, three quarters of it easily. it's time sensitive. the dead trees many of which litter our national forests you go south of flathead lake our forests are dead. combining with the historic drought, and the wildfires, season is longer, it's hot